No. 5:28, 3 (Romanus, Hassing, & Gärling, 1996; Romanus, Karlsson, & Gärling, 1997) . Several motivational explanations have therefore been proposed. In this vein Thaler and Johnson (1990) and Thaler (1980 Thaler ( , 1985 suggested that prospect theory needs to incorporate a hedonic editing rule. Whereas other editing rules are employed for the sake of cognitive simplification, the goal of the hedonic editing rule (i.e., integrating/segregating a prior outcome) is to maximize value. An alternative account is labeled the renewable resources model (Linville & Fischer, 1991) . The point of departure is still that a decision maker maximizes value. Since a gain is believed to buffer a loss, outcomes entailing gains and losses are integrated. However, being aware of his or her limited but renewable resources to cope with large losses, multiple losses are aversive to the decision maker who will therefore segregate them. Gain-savoring resources are also perceived to be limited but renewable. Therefore, multiple gains are segregated.
As noted by Larrick (1993) , in risky choices people are often more concerned with avoiding negative outcomes than attaining positive ones. This may reflect that anticipated negative events are more salient (Taylor, 1991; Weber, 1994) . A compatible editing rule of integration/segregation proposed by Gärling and Romanus (1997) as the loss-sensitivity principle is to only add the prior outcome to the expected loss of the current choice. Since a prior loss is integrated with an expected loss, the dissatisfaction with the expected loss will increase after a loss. Conversely, since a prior gain is integrated with an expected loss, the dissatisfaction will decrease after a gain. Satisfaction with an expected gain is however not affected by a prior outcome.
In the present study we investigate whether the loss-sensitive principle extends to integration of the outcomes of concurrent decisions.
In two experiments we directly compare decisions made by groups of participants who are asked to make two concurrent decisions to decisions made by other groups of participants who are told that they have experienced a prior outcome. In the former groups the options for one of the decisions are such that we expect participants to make the choice which with a specified probability would lead to the same outcome as participants in the latter groups are told that they have experienced.
Experiment 1
In Experiment 1 we attempt to replicate the results of previous experiments Gärling et al., 1994; Romanus et al., 1996 in that participants in one of two groups are asked to choose between gambling and not gambling after no prior outcome, after a No. 5:28, 4 prior loss, or after a prior gain. The loss-sensitivity principle predicts that gambling will be chosen after a prior gain but not after a prior loss since the prior outcome is added to the expected loss. To show this, assume first that the choice of gambling is an increasing function of the difference between the value of gambling and the value of not gambling. According to prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Tversky & Fox, 1995; Tversky & Kahneman, 1992) , the value of gambling (V) may in turn be related to the sum of the value or satisfaction (v) with winning and the dissatisfaction with losing, multiplied by decision weights π(p) which are related to the probability (p) of each of the outcomes. Thus,
. It is readily seen that if in accordance with the loss-sensitivity principle the prior outcome is only added to the loss in Equation (1), a prior gain would lead to more and a prior loss to less choices of gambling.
In applying the loss-sensitivity principle to concurrent decisions, we make the assumption that the effect of a future outcome of a prior decision is the same as of a prior outcome. However, since concurrent decisions are assumed to be made at the same time, it is not in general specified which outcomes should be considered to precede other outcomes. A possibility consistent with the loss-sensitivity principle (Gärling et al., 1997a) is that only loss outcomes are integrated. If this is the case, the results for concurrent decisions would only be identical to the results for prior losses. In Experiment 1 one group of participants was informed about prior outcomes whereas another group of participants made concurrent decisions. In one of the decisions which the latter group made, with the probability of .50 the dominant options led to the same outcomes (losses or gains) as participants in the other group were told that they had experienced. Identical integration was expected in these groups when in the prior-outcome group the prior outcome led to a loss.
Method
Participants Thirty-two undergraduates at Göteborg University participated in return for the equivalent of approximately USD 7.00. They were recruited from a pool of undergraduates who at the beginning of the semester volunteered to participate in experiments. An equal number of men and women were randomly assigned to two groups which each consisted of 16 participants.
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Design
The design was mixed factorial with one between-subjects and one within-subject factor. Whether participants were informed about a prior outcome or asked to make two concurrent decisions was varied as the between-subjects factor. The prior outcome/future outcome of the concurrent decisions was varied as the within-subject factor (no prior outcome/decision, a prior gain, or a prior loss).
Materials and Procedure
Participants served individually or in groups of at most four at the same time. They were seated in private boots facing a computer. On the computer screen general instructions were first presented and read by the participants. An experimenter was present to answer questions. A sequence of fictitious noncontextual bets was then presented.
Participants encountered two blocks of bets. In one of the blocks the same sequences of single bets were presented in both groups. All bets consisted of choices between an even chance of winning a certain amount or losing half that amount and choosing not to gamble. The different bets were winning SEK 4,000 or losing SEK 2,000 (the equivalent of approximately USD 500.00 or USD 250.00), winning SEK 5,000 or losing SEK 2,500, winning SEK 6,000 or losing SEK 3,000, and winning SEK 7,000 or losing SEK 3,500, respectively.
The other block differed in the two groups. In the concurrent-decisions group participants were in this block presented two bets at the same time. In the first bets which on the computer screen appeared above the second, in half the trials participants chose between an even chance of winning a large amount (SEK 1200, SEK 1500, SEK 1800, or SEK 2100) or nothing and an even chance of winning a small amount (SEK 1000, SEK 1300, SEK 1600, or SEK 1900) or nothing. In the other half of the trials participants chose between an even chance of losing a large amount (SEK 1400, SEK 1700, SEK 2000, or SEK 2300) or nothing and an even chance of losing a small amount (SEK 1200, SEK 1500, SEK 1800, or SEK 2100) or nothing. Participants were expected to choose winning a large and losing a small amount since these options were dominant, thus their choices should result in an even chance of winning or losing the indicated amounts. The second decisions consisted of the same bets as in the block of single bets. Each one was once combined with a choice between gains, once with a choice between losses.
In the prior-outcome group participants were told each time that they had lost or won a certain amount and that they now had a choice between an even chance of winning a certain amount or losing half that amount. The prior losses and gains were exactly the same as participants in the No. 5:28, 6 concurrent-decisions group would win or lose with the probability of .50 if they chose the dominant option. In other respects the procedure was the same.
In both groups participants were in each trial asked to ponder all information presented on the computer screen at the same time as they made their decisions. In the concurrent-decisions group they were then asked to first type a number (1 or 2) corresponding to their choice in the first bet followed by a rating on a scale from 1 to 100 of how much they preferred the chosen option. When they had done that, they were asked to type a number (3 or 4) corresponding to their choice in the second bet followed by a rating on a scale from 1 to 100 of how much they preferred the chosen option. In the prior-outcome group participants only performed the second choices and ratings.
A session lasted for approximately 30 minutes after which participants were debriefed and paid.
Results and Discussion
The dominant options were as expected more frequently chosen, somewhat more frequently for gains (98.4%) than for losses (93.4%). A ttest did however not show that this difference was significant.
The mean gambling choices are given in Table 1 1 . As may be seen, there is an effect of prior outcome such that the choices of gambling decrease after a loss and increase after a gain. However, no such effect is present in the concurrent-decisions group. A 2 (concurrent decisions vs. decisions with prior outcome) by 3 (no prior outcome/decision vs. prior loss vs. prior gain) mixed ANOVA with repeated measures on the last factor yielded a significant main effect of prior outcome, F(1.81, 54.36)= 3.57, p<.05, MSe=.24, after Geisser-Greenhouse correction of the dfs. This effect was almost reliably modified by group, F(1.81, 54.36)= 3.08, p=.09, MSe=1.32, also after Geisser-Greenhouse correction of the dfs. Bonferonnicorrected separate t-tests showed that at p=.05 the mean differences were reliable between no prior outcome and prior gain and prior loss and prior gain. No pairwise mean differences were reliable in the concurrentdecisions group. The prior-outcome group differed reliably from the concurrent-decisions group for prior gain.
No. 5:28, 7 The results were as expected in the prior-outcome group, thus replicating the results of several previous experiments supporting the loss-sensitivity principle Gärling et al., 1994; Romanus et al., 1996 Romanus et al., , 1997 . According to our hypothesis, integration was also expected in the concurrent-decisions groups. Since the results failed to show this, the question must be raised why no integration of outcomes was observed when participants made concurrent decisions. It should be noted that Gärling and Romanus (1997) and Tversky and Shafir (1992) found that a prior outcome that is not yet known was ignored in making a subsequent decision. Thus, the uncertainty assigned to future outcomes of concurrent decisions may be the reason why they are not integrated.
Experiment 2
It is possible that an uncertain outcome of a decision prevents participants from integrating it with other outcomes since they do not believe it will occur. However, it may be more likely that they believe that a highly desirable or undesirable outcome will occur. Making the outcomes more desirable may then increase the likelihood that they are integrated. The primary aim of Experiment 2 was to explore this possibility.
Drawing on Romanus et al. (1996) who found that integration increased when participants were made aware of a possible loss, in Experiment 2 we contrast one group of participants who were offered bonuses making them sensitive to losses with another group of participants who were offered bonuses making them sensitive to gains. If the bonuses make uncertain outcomes more desirable to obtain or avoid, in accordance with the loss-sensitivity principle we believe that the loss outcomes of concurrent decisions will be integrated. As in Experiment 1 we compare one group of participants who are informed about prior outcomes with another group of participants who are asked to make No. 5:28, 8 concurrent decisions. In one of the decisions which the latter group made, with the probability of .50 the dominant options led to the same outcomes (losses or gains) as participants in the other group were told that they had experienced.
The loss-sensitivity principle has been shown to hold for choices of gambling, that is, when participants are faced with choices between possible gains or losses and status quo. In Experiment 2 we also attempt to extend the loss-sensitivity principle to choices between losses and between gains respectively. A straight-forward generalization of the losssensitivity principle is that we expect integration of a prior outcome to occur only for choices between losses, not for choices between gains. The choices are made between a sure loss and an even chance of losing twice the amount or nothing. In accordance with prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Tversky & Fox, 1995; Tversky & Kahneman, 1992 ) the value of the sure loss (x<0) may then be written:
. Because v is a convex function (v(x+y) > v(x)+v(y); x,y<0), a prior loss added to both loss outcomes will lead to a less negative evaluation of the sure loss and render it more likely to be chosen. In other words, participants are expected to become more risk aversive. The reverse is predicted when the prior outcome is a gain. In this case, participants will thus become more risk seeking. Our predictions are given in Table 2 .
We expect that participants in the concurrent-decisions groups will integrate loss outcomes of the concurrent decisions when they are promised a loss-minimizing bonus, not otherwise. Therefore, participants in this bonus group will make the same choices as the prior-outcome groups in all conditions except when they make choices between gains in the first decision and between losses in the second decision. Participants in the concurrent-decisions groups who are promised gain-maximizing bonus are expected to differ from the prior-outcome groups when participants in these groups make choices between losses.
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Method

Participants
Another 64 participants were recruited from the same pool of undergraduates. An equal number of men and women were randomly assigned to four groups which each consisted of 16 participants. Participants were paid the equivalent of approximately USD 7.00.
Design
The design was mixed factorial with two between-subjects and two within-subject factors. One between-subjects factor was whether participants were informed about a prior outcome or asked to make two concurrent decisions. Another between-subjects factor was whether or not participants received bonuses inducing gain maximization or loss minimization. The within-subject factors were whether there was no prior outcome/decision, a prior outcome or first decision that was a gain, or a prior outcome or first decision that was a loss, and whether the second decision was a gain or loss.
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Materials and Procedure
The materials differed from Experiment 1 in the following respects. In the block with single bets, half of the bets consisted of choices between an even chance of winning a certain amount or nothing and winning half that amount for sure. The other half consisted of choices between an even chance of losing a certain amount or nothing and losing half the amount for sure. For different bets the amounts were SEK 1600 and SEK 800 (the equivalent of approximately USD 200.00 and USD 100.00), SEK 2400 and SEK 1200, and SEK 3200 and SEK 1600, respectively. Each bet was presented twice according to individually randomized orders. Half of the participants were presented the block with single bets first, the other half last.
In the other block the single bets were in the concurrent-decisions groups presented below another bet which was the same as in Experiment 1. In the prior-outcome groups the same prior losses and gains were presented before the single bets were presented. Each prior gain or choice between gains and prior loss or choice between losses was presented twice, once combined with a choice between gains and once combined with a choice between losses. As an example, on one trial participants in the concurrent-decisions groups were given a choice between winning SEK 3,200 or nothing and winning SEK 2,400 or nothing followed by a choice between an even chance of winning SEK 1,600 or nothing and a sure gain of SEK 800. On the corresponding trial participants in the prior-outcome groups were first told that they had won SEK 3,200, then asked to make a choice between an even chance of winning SEK 1600 or nothing and a sure gain of SEK 800. On another trial participants in the concurrentdecisions groups were given a choice between a loss of SEK 4,000 or nothing and a loss of SEK 3,200 or nothing followed by a choice between an even chance of winning SEK 1600 or nothing and a sure gain of SEK 800. Before making the latter choice, participants in the prior-outcome groups were told that they had lost SEK 3,200. In yet another trial participants in the concurrent-decisions groups first had a choice between winning SEK 3,200 or nothing and winning SEK 2,400 or nothing followed by a choice between an even chance of losing SEK 1600 or nothing and a sure loss of SEK 800. In the prior-outcome groups participants were told that they had won SEK 3,200, then to make the latter choice.
The procedure was essentially the same as in the preceding experiment except that the general instructions promised participants a bonus. Specifically, participants were told that the computer would randomly determine the outcomes of five randomly selected bets. The computer would also randomly determine a lower limit on the amount won. If this limit were exceeded, participants would receive a bonus of the No. 5:28, 11 equivalent of approximately USD 7.00 in addition to the fee they were paid for participating. With the aim of inducing loss minimization, half of the participants in the concurrent-decisions and prior-outcome groups were also told that they would receive no bonus if they in one of the randomly selected gambles would loose more than an amount randomly determined by the computer.
Participants were debriefed and paid after having participated in the sessions which lasted for approximately 30 minutes. All participants were paid the bonus they had been promised.
Results and Discussion
In the concurrent-decisions groups, a large majority of the first decisions were as expected made of the dominant option (98.5% for gains, 93.5% for losses). An ANOVA did not yield any significant effects. Table 3 displays the percentages of choices of the sure options. In support of prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky 1979; Tversky & Fox, 1995; Tversky & Kahneman, 1992) , when there were no prior outcome participants tended to choose the sure gains and the risky losses. This was substantiated by a 2 (gain-maximizing vs. loss-minimizing bonus) by 2 (concurrent decisions vs. decisions with prior outcome) by 3 (no prior outcome/decision vs. prior loss vs. prior gain) by 2 (current loss vs. current gain) mixed ANOVA with repeated measures on the last three factors that yielded a significant main effect of current outcome, F(1, 60) = 63.17, p<.001, Mse=.22 A difference was also observed in that participants whose bonus depended on that they avoided losses (loss-minimizing bonus) were less risk seeking when they chose between gains than participants whose bonus depended on the amount they won (gain-maximizing bonus). This was substantiated by a significant interaction between current outcome and bonus, F (1, 60) = 7.15, p=.01, MSe=.22 . Tukey post hoc tests showed at p=.05 that the difference between the group means were reliable for current gain and the differences between current loss and current gain were reliable in both groups.
As may be further seen in Table 3 , no integration occurred in the concurrent-decisions groups. A separate ANOVA on the second decisions made by the concurrent-decisions groups only revealed a significant main effect of current outcome (p<.001). Thus, the loss-minimizing bonus did not seem to have had an effect. It should also be noted that the integration of a prior outcome was not exactly as expected in the prioroutcome groups. A prior loss appeared as expected to decrease risk seeking for choices between losses. No increase in risk seeking was however observed after a prior gain. In addition, a prior gain increased No. 5:28, 12 risk seeking when choices were made between gains. A separate ANOVA confined to the prior-outcome groups yielded a significant interaction between prior outcome and current outcome, F(1.82, 56.50) = 4.89, p<.05, MSe=.40 , after Geisser-Greenhouse correction of the dfs. Separate Bonferonni-corrected t-tests showed that at p=.05 the mean differences between current loss and gain were reliable for no prior outcome and for prior losses. For current gain the mean difference between no prior outcome and prior gain was reliable, and for current loss the mean difference between no prior outcome and prior loss was reliable.
It may thus be concluded that the loss-sensitivity principle does not generalize in a straight-forward manner to choices between losses, although it was found that risk seeking decreased after a loss when participants were facing another possible loss. Furthermore, substantiating the negative finding of Experiment 1, no integration was observed when participants made concurrent decisions. Although the lossminimizing bonus decreased risk seeking, it did not affect integration. No. 5:28, 13 General Discussion
The basic goal of this research was to test whether the loss-sensitivity principle explains how concurrent decisions are integrated. This principle implies that participants integrate losses. In Experiment 1 the results were consistent with the principle applied to integration of prior outcomes. However, no integration was observed of the outcomes of the concurrent decisions. In Experiment 2 it was assumed that increasing participants´ sensitivity to losses by means of promising them a bonus would make them employ a worst-case scenario and reason as if the loss outcomes had occurred. If so, they were believed to be more likely to integrate the outcomes of the concurrent decisions. In a similar vein Romanus et al. (1996) found that increasing salience of the loss outcome increased integration. However, the results of Experiment 2 were also negative. In addition, the integration of a prior outcome was in Experiment 2 different from that predicted from the loss-sensitivity principle when participants made choices between gains or losses respectively.
A possible explanation of the negative finding that no integration of the outcomes of the concurrent decisions occurred is still that uncertain outcomes are ignored Tversky & Shafir, 1992) . The bonus was perhaps not effective in making participants reason as if the loss outcomes had occurred. Similarly, Gärling and Romanus (1997) failed to induce this kind of reasoning by increasing the probability of the loss. Another possible explanation of why participants failed to integrate the concurrent decisions is that too much cognitive strain was imposed by the requirement to enumerate the different uncertain outcomes and their combinations. If one or both of these explanations are valid, integration should be expected of outcomes of concurrent choices between few options with certain outcomes.
A third possibility is that participants did not perceive the outcomes of the different decisions to be related. This may seem unlikely given that the outcomes were money. Also, the bonus promised to the participants in Experiment 2 should have increased their feeling that the decision outcomes were related.
Although the results of Experiment 2 showed integration of a prior outcome, this integration was not as predicted from the loss-sensitivity principle. It appears then as if the principle does not extend to choices between losses. It may be noted that the results were consistent with prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Tversky & Fox, 1995; Tversky & Kahneman, 1992) , thus that the predictions (Table 2) relied on this theory is unlikely to be a problem. Some other explanation needs to be sought.
An alternative explanation not inconsistent with the general notion underlying the loss-sensitivity principle is the following which builds on No. 5:28, 14 Heath´s (1995) suggestion that people set mental budgets in order to track their losses. In Experiment 1 and many previous experiments Gärling et al., 1994; Romanus et al., 1996; Romanus et al., 1997) , the gambles were mixed entailing both a gain and a loss. In a mixed gamble participants may focus on the loss, disregarding the gain. They do not ignore a prior outcome but integrate it with the loss. In this situation integration reflects loss-minimization. If participants face two gains as they did in Experiment 2, again they may not ignore a prior outcome but in order to minimize the loss choose the certain gain after a loss but not after a gain. Facing two losses they likewise attempt to minimize the loss by choosing the certain loss after a loss to a greater extent than after a gain.
